



Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee

Topic: Biological weapon regulation: risks and shortcomings of international law

Sponsors: State of Israel, Republic of Türkiye, United Kingdom

Signatories: Australia, China, DP Egypt, Federation of Russia, France, Ukraine, India, Republic of South Africa, Republic of Korea

Recognizing the importance of regulating bioweapons,

Alarmed by the possible effects an incorrect use of biotechnological research,

Having considered all aspects of this problem,

Concerned by the difficulties of regulating non-state actors,

Urging all nations to collaborate and work together towards a bioweapon-free world,

Acknowledging the past treaties do not sufficiently cover the recently emerging biotechnological issues,

1. **Strongly urges** the establishment of the Alliance for Biotechnology Safety (ABS), an independent body of international experts trained under United Nations auspices, which shall:
 - a. Conduct regular inspections and verification procedures to ensure proper implementation of protocols and appropriate use of research activities, thereby preventing potential misuse of such research for harmful purposes;
 - b. Identify and define critical supply chains that pose potential biological weapons threats and establish monitoring mechanisms for such chains;
 - c. Provide oversight of National Regulatory Bodies to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

2. **Strongly invites** the Security Council to introduce into the existing Biological Weapons Convention framework a new legally binding verification protocol for all State Parties, to be administered by the Alliance for Biotechnology Safety (ABS), encompassing:
 - a. Inspection visits of two categories:
 - i. Routine inspections with forty-eight (48) hours advance notification;
 - ii. Challenge inspections requiring prior approval of the ABS with twelve (12) hours advance notification;

 - b. Implementation of national regulatory frameworks and verification mechanisms for biotechnological research to prevent potential misuse that could result in harmful consequences.

3. Reaffirms Strengthened oversight of critical supply chains through the establishment of controlled substances and resources lists for designated industries and laboratories, including:
 - a. Identification and monitoring of suspicious materials;
 - b. Enhanced screening protocols for DNA synthesis activities;
 - c. Oversight of artificial intelligence applications in biotechnology through:
 - d. Development by the ABS of international guidelines for responsible use of artificial intelligence in biotechnology, encompassing:
 - i. Risk-assessment procedures for AI-assisted genetic engineering and biological modeling;
 - ii. Safeguards to prevent misuse of AI systems in designing or manipulating biological agents;
 - iii. Monitoring mechanisms for AI applications in protein design, gene editing, and biological material management;
 - iv. Promotion of cooperation between Member States to ensure transparency in advanced biotechnology applications;
 - e. Strengthening of national legislative frameworks to enable States to address emerging threats from non-State actors in accordance with international law;
 - f. Establishment of an international information-sharing mechanism to facilitate exchange of relevant information between Member States regarding biological weapons and related threats;
 - g. Implementation of a United Nations certification system for public and private entities to ensure secure access to resources and research activities.

4. Proposes a common code of conduct for the international scientific community:

In order to prevent misuse of bioscience research and in accordance with the provisions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the following common code of conduct is hereby proposed:

 - a. Ethical Standards: Scientists shall respect human dignity and adhere to relevant ethical principles, bearing responsibility to utilize biosciences for peaceful purposes that benefit humanity and to safeguard against the misuse of scientific knowledge for malicious purposes;
 - b. Responsible Conduct of Research: Scientists shall promote scientific integrity and prevent research misconduct, implementing measures to prevent misuse and mitigate negative impacts of biological products, data, expertise, and equipment;
 - c. Dissemination of Research Findings: Scientists shall balance the dissemination of research findings between maximizing benefits and minimizing harm, communicating beneficial aspects of research while mitigating potential risks that could result from publication;
 - d. Public Engagement: Scientists shall encourage public understanding of biological science and technology, including potential benefits and risks, advocating for peaceful and ethical applications while working collectively to prevent misuse of biological knowledge, tools, and technologies;
 - e. Institutional Responsibility: Research institutions shall establish appropriate mechanisms to monitor, assess, and mitigate potential vulnerabilities and risks in scientific activities and dissemination, including comprehensive training systems for scientists;

- f. International Cooperation: Scientists and institutions are encouraged to engage in international cooperation and collaboration in pursuit of peaceful innovations and applications of biosciences;
 - g. Education and Training: Scientists shall maintain professional competency through continuous education in relevant laws, regulations, international obligations, and ethical norms, receiving regular ethical training as part of professional development.
5. Further requests the international community to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to developing nations to:
- a. Establish national regulatory frameworks for dual-use biological research oversight;
 - b. Develop scientific protocols and train qualified personnel for biosafety compliance;
 - c. Build institutional capacity for national regulatory bodies to monitor BWC adherence;
 - d. Allow adequate transition periods for developing nations to implement verification measures.
6. Calls upon member states and international organizations to establish a dedicated funding mechanism for the implementation of this resolution, including:
- a. Technical assistance grants for laboratory safety infrastructure;
 - b. Training programs for regulatory personnel and scientific practitioners;
 - c. Financial support for developing verification protocols and compliance systems.
7. Recommends member states to implement an emergency protocol in response of a possible outbreak due to the misuse of biological materials as weapons:
- a. Limitation of mobilization of the population if possible;
 - i. Closure of the member states with confirmed cases;
 - ii. Possible reduction of allowed travel to essential activities;
 - iii. Suspension of leisure travel for 10 initial days.
 - b. For mandatory trips such as repatriation, travelers should be kept in a 40 day quarantine once they reach the destination;
 - i. Travel facilities capacity must be reduced in half.
 - c. These regulations are open for reassessment every 6 days. The reassessment can be carried out in less than 6 days if believed necessary by the designated group of scientists;
 - d. A committee should be created in order to periodically assess the severity and impacts of the crisis as well as the determination of the liable powers of the attack :
 - i. The committee will be composed by international experts on virology, epidemiology and crisis control as well as military intelligence;
 - ii. The committee will be in charge of launching an urgent investigation program in order to clarify and deepen the knowledge of the viral outbreak and its characteristics as well as determine the originator of the crisis and the effects and sanctions that should be enforced;
 - 1. Determination of liable powers;
 - 2. Determination of sanctions;
 - 3. Confiscation and treatment of any form of present biological weapons;

- iii. The committee will conduct a program in order to identify the potential human origin of the pathogen responsible for the outbreak;
- iv. The committee will be in charge of determining when a situation of emergency calls for the implementation of the emergency protocol.